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Emerging Military Technologies:
Balancing Medical Ethics and
National Security
Efthimios Parasidis 1
This article, prepared for the CETMONS-Frederick K. Cox
International
Law
Center’s
symposium,
International
Regulation of Emerging Military Technologies, examines the law
and ethics of emerging biomedical innovations. In addition to
unpacking the legal regime that governs the military biomedical
complex, I discuss the ethics and regulation of human subjects
research, the overlap between military law and military
medicine, and the socio-medical implications of the current
framework.
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I. Introduction
The twenty-first century is quickly taking shape as the age of the
biomedical military. As the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
candidly states, one of its primary goals is to exploit the life sciences
to create soldiers with superior physical, physiological, and cognitive
abilities. 2 Projects include: (1) developing drugs that can reduce fear,
increase aggressiveness, or keep individuals awake and alert for up to
seven days straight; (2) genetically engineering the human immune
system so that it is able to recognize and adapt to any pathogen; (3)
creating implantable electrodes that permit human-to-human and
human-to-computer communication via thought alone; and (4)
establishing human-to-computer interfaces that are able to detect a
person’s neurological state and release neurochemicals that can
combat fatigue, enhance mood, suppress or improve memory, or
facilitate learning. 3
Emerging biomedical technologies are creating new paradigms for
reevaluating the law and ethics governing the practice of medicine
and medical research. Although the motto of the American military
physician is to “conserve the fighting force,” an integral component of
military research concerns physical and cognitive enhancements that
endeavor to augment human faculties. While biomedical
enhancements have yet to be used on a widespread basis in the
theater of war, it may just be a matter of time before enhancements
are integrated into military missions. Not only must policy-makers
and the military consider the practical implications of enhanced
warfighters, a more fundamental question that must be addressed is
who should be responsible for balancing national security priorities
with medical, social, and ethical concerns.

2.

TONY TETHER, DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY, STATEMENT TO
THE SUBCOMM. ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES 11 (2003).

3.

For project details, see Catherine L. Annas & George J. Annas,
Enhancing the Fighting Force: Medical Research on American Soldiers,
25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 283, 283–308 (2009); Michael N.
Tennison & Jonathan D. Moreno, Neuroscience, Ethics, and National
Security: The State of the Art, 10 PLOS BIOLOGY, no. 3, Mar. 2012 at 1;
JONATHAN D. MORENO, Juicing the Brain, 17 SCIENTIFIC AM. MIND, no.
17, Dec. 2006, at 66–73; Hannah Hoag, Neuroengineering: Remote
Control, NATURE, June 19, 2003, at 796–798; Michael H. Bonnet et al.,
The Use of Stimulants to Modify Performance During Sleep Loss: A
Review by the Sleep Deprivation and Stimulant Task Force of the
American Academy of Sleep Medicine, 29 SLEEP 1163, 1176–1180
(2005).
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As with civilian legal doctrine, military law recognizes a
distinction between the practice of medicine and medical research.
With respect to the former, military law dictates that the DoD can
mandate that service members comply with an order to be
administered treatment of an FDA-approved medical product that the
DoD determines is in the best interest of an individual service
member or a military mission. 4 One recent example is the smallpox
vaccine mandate that was promulgated in 2002. Although smallpox
was eradicated in nature in 1980, many countries have access to the
smallpox virus via laboratory stockpiles. 5 After 9/11, the DoD feared
that smallpox would be used against U.S. troops as a biological
weapon, and thus DoD determined that the smallpox vaccine was
needed as prophylaxis. 6 In turn, DoD administered the vaccine to
thousands of service members. Although smallpox was not used
against U.S. troops, many service members suffered vaccine-related
adverse health effects, including serious and unanticipated cardiac
adverse events. 7 Notably, since DoD deemed administration of the
smallpox vaccine to be a requirement of service, pursuant to military
law, a service member who refused the vaccine was subject to courtmartial and severe punitive measures, such as docked pay and
dishonorable discharge.
With respect to military medical research, federal regulations and
DoD guidelines provide safeguards for military personnel who take
part in biomedical research conducted or sponsored by the military. In
part, these protections aim to ensure that service members are not
coerced or compelled into serving as research subjects. 8 At the same
4.

Efthimios Parasidis, Justice and Beneficence in Military Medicine and
Research, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 726 (2012).

5.

Naomi Seiler, Holly Taylor, & Ruth Faden, Legal and Ethical
Considerations in Government Compensation Plans: A Case Study of
Smallpox Immunization, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 3, 5 (2004).

6.

Bryant J. Webber et al., Spread of Vaccinia Virus Through Shaving
During Military Training, Joint base San Antonio–Lackland, TX, June
2014, MED. SURVEILLANCE MONTHLY REP., Aug. 2014, at 2, 2.

7.

See, e.g., Seiler, Taylor & Faden, supra note 4, at 12-13. As will be
discussed in this article, in addition to the smallpox vaccine, mandatory
prophylaxis for anticipated chemical or biological warfare has also
included administration of the anthrax vaccine, pyridostigmine bromide
(PB), and the botulinum toxoid (BT) vaccine. See generally, John D.
Grabenstein et al., Immunization to Protect the U.S. Armed Forces:
Heritage, Current Practice, Prospects 28 EPIDEM. REV. 3 (2006)
(reviewing the historical practice and scope of military immunizations).

8.

The regulations were enacted, in part, in response to research conducted
by the military during the twentieth century. The studies—which
includes mustard gas experiments, radiation experiments, and
experiments with LSD and other psychotropic drugs—are well
documented. See, e.g., Parasidis, supra note 3, at 724.
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time, however, there are exceptions to the regulations that allow the
DoD to mandate that non-FDA-approved products be administered to
service members. 9 When this occurs, the line between research and
practice is blurred, and it becomes unclear whether, and to what
extent, protections governing research involving human subjects
apply.
The military’s emerging focus on biomedical products and human
enhancements complicates the legal and bioethical issues that are
raised by the coalescence of military medicine and military research.
For example, in the context of emerging biomedical technologies, it is
unclear what risk-benefit profile is acceptable during battle, and
whether that standard should change in times of peace, or when war
is imminent. It is also unclear to what extent risk-related information
must be provided to service members, and whether they should be
afforded the opportunity to opt out of treatment with enhancements
or experimental products. Importantly, should a product- or researchrelated adverse event occurs, injured service members do not have the
full spectrum of legal remedies available to them as civilians do.

II. A Tangled Web of Laws and Regulations Governs
Military Medicine and Research
A. The Development of Federal Guidelines in the United States

Federal regulations governing research on human subjects are a
relatively recent construct. Although medical research in the U.S.
dates back to the beginning of the republic, a federal framework
governing human subjects research was first established in 1974
following “a series of highly publicized abuses” at the hands of
government researchers and physicians. 10 The 1974 guidelines
established a system that centered on utilization of institutional
review boards (IRBs) to review research protocols. 11 Five years later,
9.

10 U.S.C. § 1107 (1998) (codifying notice of use of an investigational new
drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use).

10.

Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. No. 143, 44512 (July 26, 2011) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. 46, 160 & 164). The abuses are well documented,
and include the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, as well as experiments
conducted at Willowbrook State Hospital and the Brooklyn Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital. See, e.g., JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1982); Allan M. Brandt, Racism and
Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8 HASTINGS CTR.
REPORT 21 (1978); Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966); CARL COLEMAN ET AL., ETHICS AND
REGULATION OF RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS 37–44 (2003).

11.

Although the federal guidelines have since expanded, IRBs continue play
an integral role in the oversight of research involving human subjects.
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the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical Research and Behavioral Research (the “National
Commission”) published the Belmont Report, which identified
fundamental ethical principles that should govern research involving
human subjects. 12 A series of amendments to the federal regulations
followed, culminating, in 1991, with the publication of the Common
Rule. 13
The Common Rule sets forth guidelines that apply to
government-funded research with human subjects. 14 Under the
Common Rule, there are three primary mechanisms for protecting
research subjects: informed consent, review by an IRB, and
institutional assurances of compliance with federal policies. 15 Among
its provisions, the Common Rule requires that risks to research
subjects are minimized, and that risks are reasonable in relation to
the anticipated benefits. 16 The Common Rule also provides additional
protections for “vulnerable populations,” which are defined as
populations that are subject to coercion or undue influence. Currently,
these subpopulations include pregnant women, children, human
fetuses and neonates, and prisoners. 17 The supplemental protections
include procedural guidelines addressing membership on IRBs that
review research protocols involving vulnerable populations, as well as
substantive guidelines that IRBs must consider in reviewing and
monitoring the research. 18
In 2011, the U.S. government published an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, which highlighted the drastic change in the
research landscape since the time the Common Rule was adopted and
the need for amendments to the law to account for these changes. In
calling for amendments to the Common Rule, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Service (HHS) and the Office of Human Research
12.

Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Research, Report Of the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979).

13.

Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §46 (2014) (original version at
56 Fed. Reg. 28,002 (1991)).

14.

Many institutions voluntarily adopt the Common Rule requirements for
all research involving human subjects, though the federal requirements
only mandate that, for non-government funded research, the institution
commit to complying with general principles of human subjects research
as, for instance, outlined in the Belmont Report. See id.; COLEMAN ET
AL., supra note 9, at 107.

15.

45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–46.124.

16.

Id.

17.

45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201–46.409.

18.

See 45 C.F.R. § 46.201–46.505.
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Protection (OHRP) emphasized the fact that the law has “not kept
pace with the evolving human research enterprise,” and highlighted
areas, including “advanced technologies” and “genomics,” where this
has been the case. 19 To date, however, no amendments to the
Common Rule have been enacted.
B. The Framework Governing Military Personnel

The DoD has adopted the Common Rule, 20 and Executive Order
12333 mandates that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) comply
with the guidelines outlined in the Common Rule. 21 In addition, DoD
Directives provide additional safeguards for service members who are
solicited for, or enrolled in, clinical trials that are conducted or
sponsored by the government. 22 At the same time, however, a number
of laws and regulations provide exceptions that negate many of the
protections. The following is a snapshot of the tangled web of laws
and regulations that apply to military personnel:
•DoD Directive 3216.02, issued November 8, 2011, defines a key
triggering term for Common Rule protections—”research
involving human subjects”—to exclude: (1) “activities carried
out solely for purposes of diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of
injury and disease in Service members and other mission
essential personnel under force health protection programs”; and
(2) activities related to an “operational test and evaluation”
(OTE) project. 23 Under 10 U.S.C. § 139, an OTE project is a
“field test, under realistic combat conditions, of any item (or
key component of) weapons, equipment, or munitions for the
purpose of determining the effectiveness and suitability of the

19.

76 Fed. Reg. 44,512; see generally, OFC. HUM. RES. PROT.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited November 22, 2014) (OHRP is
the division within HHS that “provides leadership in the protection of
the rights, welfare, and wellbeing of subjects involved in research
conducted or supported” by HHS).

20.

Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 56 Fed. Reg.
28,003, 28,012 (June 18, 1991) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 219).

21.

Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 1981 Comp., p. 200 (1981), reprinted
as amended in 3 U.S.C. 2008 Comp., p. 1064 (2008) (“No agency within
the Intelligence Community shall sponsor, contract for or conduct
research on human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued
by the Department of Health and Human Services. The subject’s
informed consent shall be documented as required by those guidelines.”).

22.

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Instru’n No. 3216.02 (Nov. 8, 2011),
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/
whs/directives/
corres/
pdf/321602p.pdf.

23.

Id.
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weapons, equipment, or munitions for use in combat by typical
military users.” 24
•The Project BioShield Act of 2004 creates the Emergency Use
Authorization (EUA) process, which provides the FDA the
authority to grant the DoD permission to use a medical product
for off-label or investigational purposes during a declared
emergency. 25 Although an EUA may be issued for both civilian
and military populations, only military personnel are subject to
forced use. 26
•Under 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f), for members of the armed forces,
the President of the U.S. can issue an informed consent waiver
for off-label or investigational use of a medical product so long
as the use is “in connection with the member’s participation in
a particular military operation.” 27
•10 U.S.C. § 980 grants the DoD the authority to issue an
informed consent waiver if a research project aims to “advance
the development of a medical product necessary to the armed
forces” and “may directly benefit the subject.” 28 The statute
does not describe the procedure that must be employed when an
informed consent waiver is granted, nor does the law limit the
type of research that may be conducted.

Taken together, in the context of human subjects research
protections, the military biomedical complex presents a case where
the exceptions swallow the rule. For example, the ability to obtain an
informed consent waiver, or bypass the clinical trial setting, and
“field-test” experimental products eviscerates meaningful safeguards
for service members. Likewise, when “activities,” as anticipated by
DoD Directive 3216.02, include use of non-FDA approved medical
products or enhancements, procedures that would trigger human
subjects research regulations in the civilian context fail to do so for
military personnel. The risks borne by service members are
significant.

24.

10 U.S.C. § 139 (2008); see also U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra, note 24
(“research involving a human being as an experimental subject” includes
activities where “an intervention or interaction with a human being for
the primary purpose of obtaining data regarding the effect of the
intervention or interaction”) (emphasis added).

25.

See Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835
(2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §201 (2004)).

26.

Id.

27.

10 U.S.C. § 1107(f) (2004).

28.

10 U.S.C. § 980(b) (2001).
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Recent examples highlight the dangers. In the 1990s, fearing use
of chemical weapons during the first Gulf War, the military
“pretreated” service members with pyridostigmine bromide (PB) and
the botulinum toxoid (BT) vaccine, two products that the FDA was
evaluating as prophylaxis aimed at mitigating the effects of chemical
warfare. 29 Following the war, veterans began suffering from serious
health problems that included cognitive difficulties, chronic
headaches, musculoskeletal problems, respiratory ailments, and
widespread pain, and had children born with birth defects at an
alarming rate. 30 In 2008, nearly two decades after administration of
the experimental products, studies revealed that PB was one of the
factors that most likely caused the health problems. 31 Commonly
referred to as Gulf War Illness, the symptoms affect between 175,000
and 250,000 veterans, which equates to approximately one-third of the
fighting force during the war. 32
The DoD’s anthrax vaccine immunization program (AVIP), which
commenced in 1998, was no less controversial. AVIP mandated offlabel use of an existing anthrax vaccine for service members deemed
to be at risk for anthrax exposure. 33 Although the FDA approved the
vaccine to protect against cutaneous anthrax (anthrax that comes
into contact with the skin), the military sought to use the vaccine as
a pretreatment for inhalation anthrax (anthrax that is inhaled)
despite the fact that the FDA had not evaluated the safety or
effectiveness of the vaccine for inhalation anthrax. 34
A congressional report, published in 2000, criticized AVIP,
characterizing the program as an “overwrought response to the threat
of anthrax” and one that “compromises the practice of medicine to
achieve military objectives.” 35 The report found that the DoD
provided service members with “heavy handed, one-sided
29.

Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1372 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

30.

See RES. ADVISORY COMM. ON GULF WAR VETS.’ ILLNESSES, GULF WAR
ILLNESS AND THE HEALTH OF GULF WAR VETERANS: SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2008), available at http://www.va.gov/racgwvi/docs/committee_documents/gwiandhealthofgwveterans_racgwvireport_2008.pdf?tab_tab_group_id=_2_1&url=%2Fwebapps%2F
blackboard%2Fexecute%2Flauncher%3Ftype%3DCourse%26id%3D_790
42_1%26url%3D.

31.

Id.; Justice Delayed: Acknowledging the Reality of Gulf War Illness, 372
LANCET 1856 (2008).

32.

RES. ADVISORY COMM. ON GULF WAR VETS.’ ILLNESSES, supra note 29 at
4.

33.

Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 860, 863 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

34.

Id. at 863.

35.

U.S. DEF. DEP’T, ANTHRAX VACCINE IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM:
UNPROVEN FORCE PROTECTION, H. REP. NO. 106-556, at 2 (2000).
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informational materials,” and that the agency was “far more
concerned with public relations than effective force protection or the
practice of medicine.” 36 The DoD refused to suspend the program, and
subsequent studies found that approximately one-in-five service
members suffered systemic adverse events, which are adverse health
consequences that last more than seven days and sometimes can last
for years or even a lifetime. 37 The systemic adverse events were more
than one hundred times those reported by the vaccine manufacturer,
and adverse reactions affected women at a rate more than twice that
of men. 38 Moreover, AVIP was implemented despite the fact that the
vaccine had not been evaluated for the potential to impair fertility or
cause fetal harm. 39
Not only is medical research highly uncertain—on average, five of
six products under review by the FDA fail to earn regulatory
approval 40—but a mélange of legal doctrines and immunities also
shield the government from liability in the event of injuries caused by
negligence or intentional harm. Given the military’s checkered history
of research with human subjects, the real-world impact of the
immunities is stunning. For example, the Feres doctrine prevents
service members from suing the government, government employees,
or agents working on behalf of the government in situations where a
service member’s injuries “arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service.” 41 Courts have interpreted the Feres doctrine
broadly to encompass claims raised by service members who suffered
severe injuries after military officials locked them in gas chambers and
exposed them to mustard gas against their will, 42 as well as soldiers
who were harmed by coerced or compelled participation in the
military’s atomic experiments 43 and the DoD’s clandestine
psychotropic drug experiments. 44 In each case, since the conduct
occurred while the soldiers were subject to military command, the
Feres doctrine served to foreclose legal remedies.

36.

Id. at 2-3.

37.

Id. at 38.

38.

Id. at 35–36.

39.

Id. at 40.

40.

Leonard Sacks, et al., Scientific and Regulatory Reasons for Delay and
Denial of FDA Approval of Initial Applications for New Drugs, 20002012, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 378, 379 (2014).

41.

Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).

42.

Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429, 438 (E.D. Va. 1980).

43.

Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1239 (3d Cir. 1981).

44.

United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 705 (1987).
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Coupled with the broad immunities provided by the Feres
doctrine, under the political question doctrine, courts are also barred
from reviewing military decisions that are political in nature. 45
Political questions include instances where it is impossible for a court
to render a judgment without making a policy decision that is beyond
the court’s discretion, or where a court’s decision would express “a
lack of respect for a coordinate branch of the government.” 46
In addition to outright dismissal of a case pursuant to the Feres
doctrine or the political question doctrine, the state secrets privilege
provides the government with the ability to withhold information in
instances where officials believe that the information could expose
facts that may compromise national security. 47 The government has
invoked the privilege often, including cases related to rendition,
torture,
interrogation,
warrantless
wiretapping,
widespread
surveillance of American and foreign civilians, drone attacks, and
lethal targeting of American and foreign citizens. 48 Courts rarely
uphold challenges to the government’s assertion of the privilege,
though investigators have uncovered instances where the government
used the privilege not to protect a state secret, but rather to cover-up
wrongful conduct. 49 The recent controversies surrounding dronetargeted killings and the NSA’s surveillance programs are examples
where the government has used the state secrets privilege to prevent
disclosure of facts directly related to legal challenges to the
programs, 50 and there is nothing that prevents the government from
invoking the privilege to withhold information in the event of a
research-related injury or a challenge to a research protocol. While
there are important reasons for limiting the ability of courts to pass
judgment on matters of national security, equally as important is
maintaining a judicial system that adequately holds government
actors responsible for the outcomes of their decisions.
45.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 227 (1962).

46.

Id. at 217.

47.

See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); Tenet v.
Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005).

48.

Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1941, 1945–46 (2007).

49.

Id. at 1942–50.

50.

Spencer S. Hsu, Obama Invokes ‘State Secrets’ Claim to Dismiss Suit
Against Targeting of U.S. Citizen al-Aulaqi, WASH. POST (Sept. 25,
2010, 1:49 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/09/25/AR2010092500560.html; Ellen Nakashima, U.S.
Reasserts Need to Keep Domestic Surveillance Secret, WASH. POST
(Dec. 21, 2013), http:// www. washingtonpost. com/ world/nationalsecurity/us-reasserts-need-to-keep-domestic-surveillance-secret/2013/
12/21/9d2b4538-6a7e-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html.
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For service members, the implications of the legal and regulatory
regime must be analyzed in light of obligations imposed by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which is the legal system
governing the armed forces. Under the UCMJ, a subordinate officer
must obey a lawful order of a superior officer. 51 This provision applies
in equal force if the order is a split-second combat-related command
given on the battlefield, or an order given on a U.S. base that relates
to a medical treatment deemed by officials to be necessary for the
good of the armed forces. 52 With respect to the latter, existing
regulations do not limit medical-related orders to products approved
by the FDA. 53 And, on a number of occasions, the DoD has mandated
that soldiers submit to non-FDA-approved medical products as a
requirement of service. 54 Under the UCMJ, refusal to submit equates
to disobeying an order and can result in punitive measures that
include reduction in rank, docked pay, jail time, and dishonorable
discharge. 55
Sanctions pursuant to this provision are not merely theoretical.
Since the 1990s, the DoD has prosecuted hundreds of service
members, including military physicians, who refused administration of
medical products that were not approved by the FDA for the use
intended by the DoD. 56 During the prosecutions, military courts
consistently denied requests by soldiers to submit evidence of safety
concerns, holding that such information was irrelevant to the
underlying issue of whether the soldier obeyed a lawful command. 57
51.

United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 396 (C.A.A.F. 2002).

52.

Id. at 398.

53.

See Determination that Informed Consent is Not Feasible or Is Contrary
to the Best Interests of the Recipients, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,180 (Oct. 5,
1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 312) (describing military
exemption from informed consent requirements); Waiving Informed
Consent: Military Use of Non-FDA-Approved Drugs in Combat, RAND
(2000), http:// www. rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/ RB7534/
index1.html (analyzing the impact of the proposed rule).

54.

See Application of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Rules of
Department of Defense Force Health Protection Programs, DoD
Instruction 6200.02 (Feb. 27, 2008) (stipulating, inter alia,
considerations upon Heads of DoD Components when deciding whether
to order vaccination of military forces using non-FDA-approved
medicines).

55.

See Washington, 57 M.J. at 396 (describing that Airman Washington’s
refusal to be inoculated with an anthrax vaccine was properly regarded
as insubordination by his superior officer and the Air Force court
martial).

56.

Randall D. Katz, Friendly Fire: The Mandatory Military Anthrax
Vaccination Program, 50 DUKE L. J. 1835, 1837, 1853, 1863 (2001).

57.

See, e.g., Bates v. Rumsfeld, 271 F. Supp. 2d 54, 64 (D.D.C. 2004); see
Washington, 57 M.J. at 398–99.
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III. The Military’s Emerging Focus on Biomedical
Innovations
The legal framework governing military medicine is particularly
troubling when one considers that a significant component of the
military’s contemporary agenda focuses on biomedical enhancements.
In recent years, a notable shift has occurred whereby military research
and military medicine have coalesced. The traditional role of military
medicine has been to “conserve the fighting force” by providing
medical care to military personnel. 58 These services have long included
preventative care, such as FDA-approved vaccines for typhoid and
yellow fever, and acute care, such as surgery in response to a combat
injury. 59 While military physicians continue to fulfill their traditional
roles of providing preventative and acute care, the concept of
conservation has broadened to encompass regimens such as
inoculations with experimental vaccines and prescriptions for human
enhancements. 60 Insofar as the military’s research agenda is fueled by
combat-related goals, there is a natural tendency to want to test new
technologies on the battlefield as quickly as possible.
Consider Dexedrine and Provigil, two drugs that are FDAapproved to treat narcolepsy and other disorders. Both are used as
stimulants to keep soldiers awake during combat missions, despite the
fact that the FDA has not analyzed whether the drugs are safe or
effective for individuals who do not suffer from the underlying
illnesses. 61 Although the U.S. government bans commercial pilots from
using the substances, the Air Force has created dose-specific regimens
for its pilots. 62
While Dexedrine and Provigil may keep soldiers awake for
extended periods of time—studies have found that service members
on Provigil can remain awake for more than eighty hours straight—
complications have arisen as to what a soldier experiences when
alertness begins to fade. 63 People using Provigil tend to think that
they are more functional than they actually are, and some service
members have cited enhancements as the root cause in “friendly fire”
bombings and unprovoked attacks on civilians. 64 “Go” pills, such as
58.

See Annas & Annas, supra note 2, at 287.

59.
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60.
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Dexedrine or Provigil, must often be balanced with “no-go” sedatives,
such as Ambien or Restoril. 65 “No-go” pills carry their own risks—
they are addictive and can cause anxiety, depression, confusion,
hallucinations, risk-taking behavior, memory problems, loss of
coordination, and suicidal thoughts. 66
With biomedical enhancements, the public health impact is
largely unpredictable. Despite the military’s regimented use of some
enhancements, studies on the short- or long-term health effects have
not been conducted. Notably, known side effects of enhancements
such as Provigil and Dexedrine include dizziness, confusion, heart
palpitations, hallucinations, abnormally excited moods, anxiety,
depression, extreme psychological dependence, psychotic episodes, and
suicidal thoughts. 67 When coupled with the military epidemic of
traumatic brain injury (TBI), which impacts an estimated twenty
percent of troops deployed since 2001, 68 the adverse effects of
enhancements are likely to be compounded. 69 Indeed, the VA has
witnessed an astronomical rise in the number of veterans seeking
treatment for TBI and other mental disorders, so much so that the
agency was recently chastised for falsely entering data into patient
medical records in order to cover-up the backlog. 70 The military’s
moral obligation to ensure that service members are not exposed to
undue medical risks must take into account the limitations of the VA
health care system.
The emergence of the biomedical military is not solely an
American concern, it is an international one. As the raid on Osama
65.

Id. at 291, 293.
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bin Laden’s complex and other targeted missions illustrate, rather
than waging large-scale wars across the globe, the national security
strategy of the U.S. has shifted to focusing on special operations by
elite fighters. 71 In many instances, U.S. operations are conducted in
conjunction with special forces from other nations. 72 Not only does the
U.S. provide extensive training for the joint missions, in some parts of
the world the U.S. trains foreign forces which then are expected to
conduct military missions without direct U.S. support. 73 If U.S. policy
permits or encourages use of investigational products or biomedical
enhancements, researchers and policy makers must consider the global
impact of such policies.
The question becomes increasingly complex as one examines the
regulatory frameworks of other nations. For example, during the
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.K. made the anthrax
vaccine optional for its troops, 74 while the U.S. had a mandatory
anthrax vaccination program. 75 Should enhancements, such as
implantable brain electrodes, become field-tested or used in military
missions, what impact will this have on nations who fight alongside
the U.S., but do not adhere to the U.S. model? Furthermore,
international law may not have an adequate remedy for a problem
that may arise in this context. Under the Geneva Convention, it is
unclear whether enhancements, or enhanced soldiers, are a “weapon”
or a “means or method of warfare”, or if they should be deemed
“biological agents.” 76 Moreover, under the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, use of biological agents that are “repugnant to
the conscience of mankind” are prohibited; while, under the Hague
Convention, warfighting that disturbs the “public conscience” is
forbidden. 77 The extent to which these international laws and norms
apply to enhancements must be analyzed objectively.

71.

See, e.g., JEREMY SCAHILL, DIRTY WARS 139 (2013).

72.

Id. at 25.

73.

Id. at 66 (highlighting efforts in Africa).

74.

UK Troops Raise Fears Over Anthrax Jab, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2003),

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/08/iraq.military.
75.

See Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), DEF. HEALTH AGENCY (Mar. 20,
2015), http://www.vaccines.mil/Anthrax.

76.

See PATRICK LIN, MAXWELL MEHLMAN, & KEITH ABNEY, ENHANCED
WARFIGHTERS: RISK, ETHICS & POLICY 28, 31 (2013).

77.

Id. at 32–36.

180

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Emerging Military Technologies

IV. CONCLUSION
The billions of dollars invested by the DoD and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have not been
provided merely to advance the progress of science. As DARPA
explains, the investments are intended to create biomedical
innovations that will transform military strategy and the warfighter. 78
As with weapons of the past, nations will work fervently to acquire or
copy the newest technologies in order to promote their own military
agendas, as will non-state-based militaries and terrorist organizations.
At some point, many technologies will invariably work their way into
the global community of civilians. Take drones, for example, where
municipal police and private companies are both examining ways to
incorporate unmanned aerial vehicles into operations on American
soil.
With human enhancements, as bioethicists have discussed, civilian
uses are both common and, oftentimes, encouraged by custom or
circumstance. 79 Studies have highlighted the extensive use of
enhancements across socio-economic backgrounds, including use by
doctors, lawyers, academics, students, and truck drivers. 80 Insofar as
military developments will unquestionably impact civilians, a sociomedical evaluation of the military biomedical complex is necessary.
While biomedical innovations may provide soldiers with special
competitive advantages, they also come with special risks. Although
medical risk cannot be eliminated—all treatments carry the chance of
adverse events—the degree of risk of a particular treatment is
proportional to the robustness of information related to that
treatment. Simply stated, the more one knows about a medical
treatment, the better one can predict risks and benefits, and assess
whether utilization of the treatment is justifiable. This calculation
contains procedural and substantive components, and deriving an
accurate risk-benefit profile requires diligence and intellectual honesty
at each stage of the analysis. One weak link—be it in the process of
approving use of a biomedical product on military personnel, the
evaluation of data related to risks and benefits, or the decision to use
a product for a particular individual—can increase risk exposure
78.
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significantly and unnecessarily. The potential harms to service
members are exacerbated when one considers the inadequacies of the
health care system for veterans. 81
It is in this context that law can play a transformative role, by
guiding behavior and incentivizing risk management and risk
mitigation. Yet, rather than mitigating risk by establishing protocols
that balance national security concerns with clinical uncertainties,
medical ethics, and constitutional liberties, the current legal and
regulatory regime increases risk for U.S. service members. In the name
of national security, the law embeds military command structure into
military medicine and prevents injured service members from seeking
redress through the courts.
The socio-medical impact of the existing regime is striking.
Studies have consistently found that the odds of a person entering the
military are correlated with economic status, race, family structure,
high school academic achievement, and parental education.82
Individuals who grow up in families of a low socioeconomic status are
more likely to enlist in the military, while those in the top income
distribution are under-represented in the armed forces. 83 Individuals
who enlist in the military are less likely to have grown up with both
biological parents and are more likely to come from families where the
parents had less education. 84 When compared to the general
population, enlistees have fewer years of formal education and are
more likely to have dropped out of high school.85 In 2010, AfricanAmericans comprised 17% of the armed forces and 12.6% of the
general population, which equates to over-representation of
approximately 35%. 86 African-American women are enlisting in the
military at a rate far higher than white or Latino women; 31% of
81.
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women service members are African-American, which is double the
percentage of the civilian female population that identifies as AfricanAmerican. 87
To the extent that laws disproportionally impact under-privileged
segments of society, elected officials have an indispensable moral
responsibility to remedy the shortcomings of the existing framework.
That said, regardless of how elected officials address this problem, the
fact that a disproportionate impact stems from the status quo
challenges bioethicists to reconsider notions of equality and
vulnerability.
At a broader level, the military biomedical complex provides an
illuminating paradigm for analyzing the extent to which power
imbalances should influence the structure of laws governing one’s
freedom to contract, and for examining the relationship between an
individual and the sovereign as it relates to the commodification of
the human body. Should an individual be permitted to contract away
their right to autonomy? To what extent is a service member the
“property” of the military or the national security state? Does the
answer to this question change if a draft is implemented? For
voluntary or compulsory military service, are there liberties that the
state should be precluded from usurping?
Privatization of the U.S. military adds another layer of
complexity. The post-9/11 security state has developed a substantial
private militia that utilizes cutting-edge military technologies and
conducts, among other military endeavors, highly classified special-op
missions. 88 Does the law treat warriors working for private companies
differently? Should it?
Military exceptionalism is largely based on the notion that
collective interests trump individual interests in matters of national
security. If history is any guide, there must be limits to this principle.
Proponents of the status quo rely largely on consequentialist or
utilitarian rationales. At a broader level, however, principles of virtue
ethics should inform the rule of the law, particularly in instances
where, as in the military context, vulnerable populations bear what
may be reasonably characterized as undue risks.
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